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Quantum key distribution (QKD) is often, more correctly, called key growing. Given a short
key as a seed, QKD enables two parties, connected by an insecure quantum channel, to generate a
secret key of arbitrary length. Conversely, no key agreement is possible without access to an initial
key. Here, we consider another fundamental cryptographic task, commitments. While, similar to
key agreement, commitments cannot be realized from scratch, we ask whether they may be grown.
That is, given the ability to commit to a fixed number of bits, is there a way to augment this
to commitments to strings of arbitrary length? Using recently developed information-theoretic
techniques, we answer this question in the negative.
Introduction.— Quantum key distribution [1, 2] allows
two honest parties, Alice and Bob, to establish a shared
secret key, using only insecure quantum communication.
However, a necessary precondition for this to be possi-
ble is that they have access to a pre-shared initial key,
to be used for authentication—a fact that is sometimes
overlooked in the literature. It is easy to see that with-
out such an initial key, it is impossible for Alice to dis-
tinguish between Bob and an eavesdropper pretending
to be Bob—rendering all further security considerations
futile. Nevertheless, once an initial key is available, this
key can be grown, i.e., expanded to arbitrary length [3].
Another similar example is coin tossing. It is known
that there is no unconditionally secure two-party protocol
that generates a fair random coin which cannot be biased
by a dishonest party [4]. However, if the two parties have
access to a certain number of ideal coin tosses to start
with, they can use protocols to obtain a larger number of
secure coin tosses. (Here, security holds in a standalone
model, where it is assumed that the protocol is invoked
only once [5].)
Following this line of thought, one may wonder
whether other cryptographic primitives, such as com-
mitments [4], can be grown in a similar way. A string
commitment protocol allows a sender to commit to a bit
string that is revealed to a receiver at a later point. The
protocol is secure for the sender (hiding) if the receiver
cannot gain information about the commitment before
she reveals it and it is secure for the receiver (binding)
if the sender cannot change the string once committed.
Here, we are only interested in unconditionally secure
protocols, i.e., protocols that are secure against dishon-
est parties with unlimited computing power.
While it is known that unconditionally secure commit-
ments cannot be implemented using classical or quan-
tum communication only [6, 7] (see also [8, 9]), this Let-
ter strives to answer the question whether it is possible
to implement a long string commitment with a proto-
col that uses a smaller number of bit commitments that
are provided as a resource. (A bit commitment is a string
commitment of length one.) We will answer this question
to the negative, showing that it is impossible to expand
commitments even minimally, and even under relaxed se-
curity criteria.
Commitments have a wide variety of applications in
theoretical cryptography, ranging from zero-knowledge
proofs [10] to secure coin tossing. In particular, com-
mitments can be used to implement statistically secure
and universally composable oblivious transfer [11–13], a
functionality that is sufficient to realize universal secure
two-party computation [14].
In [15] it has been shown that unconditionally secure
oblivious transfer cannot be extended using quantum
protocols. We note that this already imposes certain
bounds on the resources that can be obtained from a
limited number of bit commitments [16]. Furthermore,
bounds on the quality of commitments for relaxed secu-
rity definitions have been shown in [17–19]. Conversely,
it has been shown that secure commitments can be im-
plemented in relativistic settings involving multiple sites
[20] or using trusted resources such as a noisy channel [21]
or (trusted) distributed randomness [22, 23].
We now proceed with a more detailed specification of
string commitment as well as the class of protocols we
consider. We then briefly review the smooth entropy cal-
culus, which is required for our technical arguments. Our
main result that commitments cannot be grown is stated
as Theorem 1. This is supplemented with an alternative
version of the claim, which applies if the initial function-
ality enables committing to quantum bits.
String Commitments.—A (classical) string commit-
ment of length ℓ is a functionality that takes a bit string
x ∈ {0, 1}ℓ from the sender and outputs the message
committed to the receiver. Later, on input open from
the sender, the functionality sends x to the receiver.
In the following, we consider implementations of this
task by quantum protocols between two parties, Alice
(who holds system A) and Bob (B). They have access
to a noiseless quantum and a noiseless classical channel,
as well as to an additional resource, C (to be specified
2later). In any round of the protocol, the parties may
perform an arbitrary quantum operation on the system
in their possession conditioned on the available classical
information [24] — this includes generating the input
for the available communication interfaces. The use of
the quantum channel then corresponds to a party trans-
ferring a part of her system to the other party. The
classical channel measures the input in a canonical basis
and sends the outcome to the receiver. We assume that
the total number of rounds of the protocol is bounded
by some finite number. By padding the protocol with
empty rounds, this corresponds to the assumption that
the number of rounds is equal in every execution.
A string commitment scheme over strings of length ℓ
generally consists of two phases. In the first, the commit
phase, the sender commits to an ℓ-bit string x. Later,
in the opening phase the sender reveals x to the receiver.
The total system (consisting of the subsystems controlled
by Alice and Bob) is assumed to be in a pure state ini-
tially. By introducing an additional space the quantum
operations of both parties can be purified, i.e., we can
assume that the parties apply, conditioned on the in-
formation shared over the classical channel, isometries to
their systems. Thus, we will assume in the following that
the state at the end of the commit phase conditioned on
all the classical communication is pure.
Security Definitions.—Our main technical contribu-
tion will be a quantitative statement on the impossibil-
ity of growing string commitments. To formulate this
statement, we introduce two definitions that capture the
cheating probability of Alice and the information gain
of Bob, respectively. We emphasize that the properties
required in these definitions are only necessary (we there-
fore call the definitions “weak”), but would not be suf-
ficient for the security of a protocol [25]. Since we are
interested in the impossibility of certain protocols, this
only strengthens our results.
Using a commitment protocol, a (quantum) Alice can
always commit to a superposition of strings [6, 26] as
follows: she prepares a state 1√
|X |
∑
x∈X |x〉X ⊗ |x〉X′ ,
where X is a subset of the ℓ-bit strings. Then she hon-
estly executes the commit protocol with the first half of
this state as input and keeps the system X ′. We denote
the resulting joint state of Alice, Bob and the resource
system by ρXA′BC , where A
′ stands for XX ′A. Later,
Alice can measure X ′ and execute the opening phase of
the protocol with the resulting string x. Thus, even for
a perfectly binding commitment scheme, we cannot re-
quire that there is a fixed value x Alice is committed to
after the commit phase. Rather, we can only demand
that
∑
x∈{0,1}n px ≤ 1 where px is the probability that
Alice successfully reveals some x in the opening phase.
In order to quantify the degree of bindingness of a pro-
tocol, we consider the following attack by Alice. First,
she commits to a superposition of strings from a set
X0 ⊆ {0, 1}ℓ as before. Then, she tries to map (by a lo-
cal transformation EA on her system) the resulting state
ρX0A′BC to ρ
X1
A′BC , corresponding to the commitment to a
set X1 ⊆ {0, 1}ℓ which is disjoint from X0. Such an attack
is successful with probability at least ∆ if the protocol
cannot detect the transformation with probability more
than 1−∆. Using the trace distance, D(ρ, τ) := 12 ||ρ−τ ||1,
this can be turned into a necessary condition for security,
formulated in terms of the closeness of the transformed
state, (EA′ ⊗ 1BC)(ρX0A′BC), to the target state ρX1A′BC .
Definition (Weakly ∆-binding). We call a commitment
scheme weakly ∆-binding if
min
X0,X1
min
EA′
D
(
(EA′ ⊗ 1BC)(ρX0A′BC), ρX1A′BC
)
≥ 1−∆ ,
where X0 and X1 are disjoint sets of strings from {0, 1}ℓ
and EA′ is a completely positive trace preserving map
acting on Alice’s system.
To define the hiding property, we consider the joint
state ρxAB of Alice’s and Bob’s systems that results from
an execution of the protocol where both parties are hon-
est and Alice commits to x. For a commitment scheme
to be ε-hiding, we require that D(ρxB, ρ
x′
B ) ≤ ε for any
x, x′. This immediately implies the following (necessary)
security condition.
Definition (Weakly ε-hiding). A bit commitment pro-
tocol is weakly ε-hiding for uniform X if the marginal
state ρXB after the commit phase is ε-close to a state
where X is uniform with respect to B, i.e.,
min
σB
D(ρXB,
1
|X |1X ⊗ σB) ≤ ε . (1)
Smooth Entropies.—Our proof is based on the insight
that every conceivable protocol that aims to extend bit
commitment allows for an attack, which can be estab-
lished using known results on privacy amplification and
the smooth entropy formalism. (Privacy amplification
has also been used in [18] to construct attacks on com-
mitment schemes.) The detailed proofs of the technical
statements can be found in [27].
Let ρXB =
∑
x P (x)|x〉〈x|⊗ρxB be a classical-quantum
(CQ) state. Then the min-entropy of X conditioned on
B, denotedHmin(X |B)ρ, corresponds to the negative log-
arithm of the probability of guessing X correctly from a
quantum memory B [28]. The smooth min-entropy of
a state is defined as Hεmin(X |B)ρ := maxρ˜Hmin(X |B)ρ˜,
where the optimization is over all (sub-normalized) states
ε-close to ρXB in terms of the purified distance, which
corresponds to the minimum trace distance between their
purifications. The purified distance between two states,
ρ and ρ˜, is upper bounded by
√
2D(ρ, ρ˜) [29].
The leftover hash lemma against quantum side infor-
mation [30] (see also [31]) asserts that the smooth min-
entropy of Hεmin(X |B)ρ characterizes the amount of uni-
form randomness that can be extracted from X with
3respect to the quantum side information B. A conse-
quence of this is the following fact: for any CQ state
ρXB =
1
2ℓ
∑
x∈{0,1}ℓ |x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxB there exists a function
f : {0, 1}ℓ → {0, 1} such that
D(ρf,X0B , ρ
f,X1
B ) ≤ 2ǫ+
√
21−H
ε
min(X|B)ρ , (2)
where ρf,XzB =
1
|f−1(z)|
∑
x∈f−1(z) ρ
x
B .
In order to derive bounds on the conditional min-
entropy when the conditioning system is manipulated,
we use the following data-processing inequalities. Let
ρXBC be a CQ state, where C is an additional quan-
tum register with dimension |C|. Then, the min-entropy
Hεmin(X |BC)ρ cannot increase by more than log |C| when
a projective measurement C→Z is applied,
Hεmin(X |BC)ρ ≥ Hεmin(X |BZ)ρ − log |C| . (3)
Moreover, if the classical register Z is discarded, we have
Hεmin(X |BZ)ρ ≥ Hεmin(X |B)ρ − log |Z| . (4)
The following fact, also used in the proofs of [6, 7, 32],
is an essential building block of our impossibility proofs:
let φ0AB and φ
1
AB be two pure states corresponding to
the joint state of Alice and Bob when committing to ’0’
and ’1’, respectively. If the marginal state of φ0AB and
φ1AB on Bob’s system is (almost) the same, then there ex-
ists a unitary UA on Alice system that (approximately)
transforms φ0AB into φ
1
AB , i.e., (UA⊗1B)|φ0AB〉 ≈ |φ1AB〉.
This reasoning can be generalized to joint states ρbY AY B
that are pure conditioned on all the classical informa-
tion Y available to both Alice and Bob as follows. If
D(ρ0Y B, ρ
1
Y B) ≤ ε, then there exists a unitary UY A such
that
D
(
UY A ρ
0
Y AY B U
†
Y A, ρ
1
Y AY B
) ≤ √2ε , (5)
where we omitted the identity operator on Y B.
Main Result—One can trivially implement a string
commitment of length n from n bit commitments. Fur-
thermore, it is easy to see that, using a resource which
allows the parties to commit to n qubits, one can imple-
ment n individual commitments to two bits each using
superdense coding [33], and, therefore, also a string com-
mitment of length 2n. Our main result essentially states
that these two trivial implementations are essentially op-
timal.
More precisely, we first consider implementations of
string commitments based on a functionality that en-
ables n perfect (classical) bit commitments. We show
that the length of the implemented string commitment
is approximately upper bounded by n if this is required
to be highly binding and hiding.
Theorem 1. Every quantum protocol which uses nA bit
commitments from Alice to Bob and nB bit commitments
from Bob to Alice with n = nA+nB as a resource and im-
plements an ε-hiding and ∆-binding string commitment
of length ℓ must satisfy
ℓ ≤ n− 2 log
(
(1 −∆)2
4
−
√
2ε
)
− 1 .
In particular, if ∆ = ε ≤ 0.01, then ℓ < n+ 6.
Proof. In the following, we construct an attack by Alice
on a modified protocol that does not use the resource
bit commitments and is not necessarily hiding. In this
protocol we make Bob more powerful in the sense that
he can simulate the original protocol locally. Thus, any
successful attack of Alice against the modified protocol
implies a successful attack against the original protocol.
In the modified protocol, Alice, instead of using the
resource bit commitments, measures the bits to be com-
mitted, stores a copy and sends them to Bob, who stores
them in a classical register, CA. When one of these com-
mitments is opened, he moves the corresponding bit to
his register B. Bob simulates the action of his commit-
ments locally as follows: instead of measuring a register,
Y , and sending the outcome to the commitment func-
tionality, he applies the isometry U : |y〉Y 7→ |yy〉Y Y ′ pu-
rifying the measurement of the committed bit and stores
Y ′ in another register, CB. When Bob has to open the
commitment, he measures Y ′ and sends the outcome to
Alice over the classical channel. Furthermore, the state
conditioned on the classical communication is again pure.
Let ρXABC =
1
2ℓ
∑
x |x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxABC , where C stands
for CACB , be the state resulting from the execution of
the modified protocol when the input X of Alice is uni-
formly distributed. Its marginal state, ρXAB, is the cor-
responding state at the end of the commit phase of the
original commitment protocol. The state ρXB must be
weakly ε-hiding. Thus, by the definition of the smooth
min-entropy and setting ε˜ :=
√
2ε, we get
H ε˜min(X |B)ρ ≥ log |X | = ℓ. (6)
Therefore, inequalities (3) and (4) imply that
H ε˜min(X |BCACB)ρ ≥ H ε˜min(X |B)ρ − n ≥ ℓ− n . (7)
From (2) we know that there exists a function f such that
D(ρX0BC , ρ
X1
BC) ≤ 2δ, where δ := ε˜ + 12
√
21−H
ε˜
min(X|BC)ρ
and ρXzBC =
1
|f−1(z)|
∑
x∈f−1(z) ρ
x
BC . In order to construct
a concrete attack, let Alice choose a bit z and commit to
a uniform superposition of all strings x with f(x) = z.
Then the resulting joint state ρXzA′BC at the end of the
commit phase is pure conditioned an all the shared classi-
cal information. According to (5) there exists, therefore,
a unitary UA′ on Alice’s system that transforms ρ
Xz
A′BC
into a state which is 2
√
δ-close to ρ
X1−z
A′BC in terms of the
trace distance. The definition of weakly ∆-binding im-
plies that 1−∆ ≤ 2√δ and, together with (7), the state-
ment follows.
4Next, we consider protocols which use a quantum com-
mitment functionality that allows the parties to commit
to (and later reveal) n qubit states. By slightly modify-
ing the proof of the theorem, we show that there cannot
exist a protocol that uses such a resource and implements
a string commitment of length larger than 2n. We con-
sider again a modified protocol, where Bob simulates the
resource system as follows: Alice, instead of using the
resource, sends the committed qubits to Bob, and Bob
keeps all the qubits that he would send to the commit-
ment functionality in the original protocol in a register,
C. Let ρXABC be the joint state after the execution of
the commit phase when Alice’s input X is uniformly dis-
tributed. We have H ε˜min(X |B)ρ ≥ log |X | = ℓ as in (6).
Inequalities (3) and (4) together imply that conditioning
on an additional quantum system C cannot decrease the
smooth min-entropy by more than 2 log |C|. Thus, we
have
H ε˜min(X |BC)ρ ≥ H ε˜min(X |B)ρ − 2 log |C| = ℓ− 2n . (8)
Now we proceed as in the proof of the main theorem to
get
ℓ ≤ 2n− 2 log
(
(1 −∆)2
4
−
√
2ε
)
− 1 . (9)
Note that the same reasoning applies to any resource
which can be simulated by Bob such that the resulting
state at the end of the commit phase is pure conditioned
on all the classical communication and the simulated re-
source uses an additional memory of size at most log |C|.
Thus, inequality (9) holds for arbitrary such resources
with log |C| ≤ n.
Conclusions—We proved that it is impossible to use a
small number of bit commitments as a resource to imple-
ment a larger string commitment that is both arbitrarily
binding and hiding. This is in stark contrast to corre-
sponding positive results for other cryptographic primi-
tives, such as quantum key distribution or coin flipping,
where the resource of interest, once available in finite
number, can be enlarged ad infinitum.
The techniques we use to show our impossibility results
can be applied to prove more general results on the possi-
bility and efficiency of two-party cryptography. In partic-
ular, they can be used to prove bounds on the efficiency
of implementations of string commitments from obliv-
ious transfer and, more generally, from resources that
distribute trusted correlations to the parties. Moreover,
the impossibility results on implementations of oblivious
transfer presented in [15] can be improved using these
techniques.
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APPENDIX
Section A contains general definitions and technical lemmas related to distance measures and the smooth entropy
calculus, as needed for our work. In Section B we present the full proofs of our main results.
A. Preliminaries
We restrict our attention to finite-dimensional Hilbert spaces H. We use P(H) to denote the set of positive semi-
definite operators on H. We define the set of normalized quantum states by S=(H) := {ρ ∈ P(H) : tr ρ = 1} and
the set of sub-normalized states by S≤(H) := {ρ ∈ P(H) : 0 < tr ρ ≤ 1}. Given a state ρAB ∈ S=(HA ⊗ HB) we
denote by ρA and ρB its marginal states ρA = trB(ρAB) and ρB = trA(ρAB). We define the fidelity between two states
ρ, τ ∈ S=(ρ) as F (ρ, τ) = ||√ρ
√
τ ||1. For ρ, τ ∈ S=(HA), we define the trace distance between ρ and τ as
D(ρ, τ) :=
1
2
||ρ− τ ||1.
For b ∈ {0, 1}, let ρbXB =
∑
x |x〉〈x| ⊗ ρx,bB be classical-quantum (CQ) states. Then we have (see [30] for a proof)
||ρ0XB − ρ1XB||1 =
∑
x∈X
||ρx,0B − ρx,1B ||1. (10)
Definition 2. For ρAB ∈ S=(HAB) we define the distance from uniform of A conditioned on B as
∆(A|B)ρ := min
σB
D(ρAB, ωA ⊗ σB) , (11)
where ωA := 1A/ dimHA and the minimum is taken over all σB ∈ S=(HB).
Lemma 3. Let ρXB =
∑
x∈{0,1}
1
2 |x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxB be a CQ state and ∆(X |B)ρ ≤ ε. Then
D(ρ0B, ρ
1
B) ≤ 2ε.
Proof. D(ρXB, ωA ⊗ σB) ≤ ε implies
||ρ0B − ρ1B||1 ≤ ||ρ0B − σB||1 + ||ρ1B − σB ||1 ≤ 4ε
where we used (10) and, therefore, we have D(ρ0B, ρ
1
B) ≤ 2ε.
Furthermore, we will make use of the following well-known technical lemma which is also used in [6, 7, 32].
Lemma 4. Let |ψ0AB〉 and |ψ1AB〉 be states with D(ρ0B, ρ1B) ≤ ε where ρxB = trA|ψxAB〉〈ψxAB |. Then there exists a
unitary UA such that
D(|φ1AB〉〈φ1AB |, |ψ1AB〉〈ψ1AB|) ≤
√
2ε
with φ1AB = (UA ⊗ 1B)|ψ0AB〉.
6Proof. D(ρ0B, ρ
1
B) ≤ ε implies F (ρ0B , ρ1B) ≥ 1 − ε. From Uhlmann’s theorem we know that there exists a unitary UA
such that F (|φ1AB〉〈φ1AB |, |ψ1AB〉〈ψ1AB|) ≥ 1 − ε where |φ1AB〉 = (UA ⊗ 1B)|ψ0AB〉. Since D(ρ, τ) ≤
√
1− F (ρ, τ)2 for
any ρ, τ ∈ S=(H) [35], we have
√
1−D(|φ1AB〉〈φ1AB |, |ψ1AB〉〈ψ1AB |)2 ≥ 1− ε. Hence,
D(|φ1AB〉〈φ1AB |, |ψ1AB〉〈ψ1AB |) ≤
√
1− (1− ε)2 ≤
√
2ε
Lemma 4 can be generalized to states which are pure conditioned on all classical information available to both A
and B in the following way.
Lemma 5. For b ∈ {0, 1}, let
ρbXX′AB =
∑
x
Pb(x)|x〉〈x|X ⊗ |x〉〈x|X′ ⊗ |ψx,bAB〉〈ψx,bAB |
with D(ρ0X′B, ρ
1
X′B) ≤ ε. Then there exists a unitary UAX such that
D(ρ′1XX′AB, ρ
1
XX′AB) ≤ 2ε
where ρ′1XX′AB = (UXA ⊗ 1X′B)ρ0XX′AB(UXA ⊗ 1X′B)†.
Proof. Define |ψbXX′X′′AB〉 :=
∑
x
√
Pb(x)|x〉X ⊗ |x〉X′ ⊗ |x〉X′′ ⊗ |ψx,bAB〉 and let
ρbX′X′′B = trXA(|ψbXX′X′′AB〉〈ψbXX′X′′AB|).
Then
D(ρ0X′X′′B, ρ
1
X′X′′B) = D(ρ
0
X′B, ρ
1
X′B) ≤ ε
Thus, Lemma 4 implies the existence of a unitary UAX such that
D(|φ1XX′X′′AB〉〈φ1XX′X′′AB|, |ψ1XX′X′′AB〉〈ψ1XX′X′′AB |) ≤
√
2ε
with |φ1XX′X′′AB〉 = (UAX ⊗ 1X′X′′B)|ψ0XX′X′′AB〉. The statement then follows from the fact that taking the partial
trace over X ′′ cannot increase the trace distance and commutes with the unitary UAX as follows. Let ρ
′1
XX′AB =
(UXA ⊗ 1X′B)ρ0XX′AB(UXA ⊗ 1X′B)†. Then
D((UXA ⊗ 1X′B)ρ0XX′AB(UXA ⊗ 1X′B)†, ρ1XX′AB)
= D((UXA ⊗ 1X′B)trX”(ρ0XX′X′′AB)(UXA ⊗ 1X′B)†, trX”(ρ1XX′X′′AB))
= D(trX”((UXA ⊗ 1X′X′′B)ρ0XX′X′′AB(UXA ⊗ 1X′X′′B)†), trX”(ρ1XX′X′′AB))
≤ D((UXA ⊗ 1X′X′′B)ρ0XX′X′′AB(UXA ⊗ 1X′X′′B)†, ρ1XX′X′′AB)
≤
√
2ε
We define the non-smooth min-entropy as follows.
Definition 6 (Min-Entropy).
Hmin(A|B)ρ := max
σB∈S=(HB)
sup
{
λ ∈ R : 2−λ 1A ⊗ σB ≥ ρAB
}
.
Then we define the smooth version of the min-entropy of a state ρ as an optimization of the non-smooth entropy
over a set of states that are close to ρ. As a distance measure between two states we use the purified distance, which
corresponds to the minimum trace distance between purifications of these states [29].
Definition 7 (Purified Distance). For ρ, τ ∈ S≤(H), we define the purified distance between ρ and τ as
P (ρ, τ) :=
√
1− F¯ (ρ, τ)2
where the generalized fidelity F¯ is defined as F¯ (ρ, τ) = F (ρ, τ) +
√
(1− tr ρ)(1− tr τ). Note that F¯ (ρ, τ) = F (ρ, τ) if
at least one of the states is normalized.
7Let ε ≥ 0 and ρ ∈ S≤(H) with
√
tr ρ > ε. Then, we define an ε-ball in H around ρ as
Bε(H; ρ) := {τ ∈ S≤(H) : P (τ, ρ) ≤ ε} .
The smoothed version of the min-entropy is defined as follows.
Definition 8 (Smooth Min-Entropy). Let ε ≥ 0 and ρAB ∈ S≤(HAB), then the ε-smooth min-entropy of A conditioned
on B of ρAB is defined as
Hεmin(A|B)ρ := max
ρ˜AB∈Bε(ρAB)
Hmin(A|B)ρ˜ .
A family F of functions from X to Z is called weakly two-universal [36] if for any pair of distinct inputs x and x′
the probability of a collision f(x) = f(x′) is at most 1/|Z| if f is chosen at random from F . The following lemma [30]
(see also [31]) shows that weak two-universal hash functions are strong extractors against quantum side information,
i.e., the output of the function is uniform with respect to the side information and the choice of the function.
Lemma 9 (Leftover Hash Lemma). Let F be a family of weak two-universal hash functions from X to {0, 1}.
Let ρXB =
∑
x P (x)|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxB be a CQ state and ρFZB = 1|F|
∑
f
∑
z |f〉〈f | ⊗ |z〉〈z| ⊗ ρf,zB with z ∈ {0, 1} and
ρf,zB =
∑
x∈f−1(z) P (x)ρ
x
B . Then
∆(Z|BF )ρ ≤ ǫ+ 1
2
√
21−H
ε
min(X|B)ρ .
Lemma 10. Let ρXB =
1
2ℓ
∑
x∈{0,1}ℓ |x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxB be a CQ state. Then there exists a function f : {0, 1}ℓ → {0, 1} in
F such that
D(ρf,0B , ρ
f,1
B ) ≤ 2
(
ǫ+
1
2
√
21−H
ε
min(X|B)ρ
)
,
where ρf,zB =
1
|f−1(z)|
∑
x∈f−1(z) ρ
x
B.
Proof. Let F be a family of two-universal hash functions f : {0, 1}ℓ → {0, 1} such that every f is balanced, i.e.,
|{x ∈ {0, 1}ℓ : f(x) = 0}| = 2ℓ−1. From Lemma 9 we know that
∆(Z|BCF )ρ ≤ δ
where δ := ε+ 12
√
21−H
ε
min(X|B)ρ and Z := f(X). Thus, there must exist a function f ∈ F such that ∆(Z|B)ρ[f] ≤ δ.
For z ∈ {0, 1} let
ρf,zB =
1
2ℓ−1
∑
x∈f−1(z)
ρxB.
From Lemma 3 we then have D(ρf,0BC , ρ
f,1
BC) ≤ 2δ.
The following lemma shows that the conditional min-entropy Hεmin(A|B)ρ can decrease by at most log |Z| when
conditioning on an additional classical system Z.
Lemma 11. Let ε > 0 and let ρABZ be a tripartite state that is classical on Z with respect to some orthonormal basis
{|z〉}z. Then
Hεmin(A|BZ)ρ ≥ Hεmin(A|B)ρ − log |Z|.
Proof. Let ρ˜AB be the state that optimizes the min-entropy H
ε
min(A|B)ρ = Hmin(A|B)ρ˜. Then, there exists an
extension ρ˜ABZ of ρ˜AB that is ε-close to ρABZ and classical on Z. See [29], where it is shown that there always
exists an ε-close extension and that the purified distance can only decrease under a measurement in the Z basis. Let
ρ˜ABZ =
∑
z ρ˜
z
AB ⊗ |z〉〈z| so that ρ˜zAB ≤ ρ˜AB for all z. By the definition of the min-entropy, we have
ρ˜zAB ≤ ρ˜AB ≤ 2−H
ε
min(A|B)1A ⊗ σB
for the optimal σB . Hence,
ρ˜ABC =
∑
ρ˜zAB ⊗ |z〉〈z| ≤ 2−H
ε
min(A|B)1A ⊗ σB ⊗ 1Z .
The lemma now follows from the definition of the min-entropy Hεmin(A|BZ)ρ, where ρ˜ABZ and σBZ = σB ⊗ 1Z/|Z|
are candidates for the optimization.
8The following lemma shows that the min-entropy Hεmin(A|BC)ρ cannot increase too much when a projective mea-
surement is applied to system C.
Lemma 12. Let ε ≥ 0 and let ρABC be a tri-partite state. Furthermore, let M be a projective measurement in the
basis {|z〉}z on C and ρABZ := IAB ⊗M(ρABC), where IAB is the identity operation on A and B. Then,
Hεmin(A|BC)ρ ≥ Hεmin(A|BZ)ρ − log |Z| .
Proof. Let U : |z〉C 7→ |zz〉ZZ′ be the isometry purifying M in the sense that ρABZ = trZ′(ρABZZ′ ), where ρABZZ′ :=
UρABCU
†. Covariance under isometries of the smooth min-entropy implies
Hεmin(A|BC)ρ = Hεmin(A|BZZ ′)ρ .
Moreover, for some states ρ˜ABZ and σ˜BZ , we have
Hεmin(A|BZ)ρ = sup
{
λ ∈ R : ρ˜ABZ ≤ 2−λ 1A ⊗ σ˜BZ
}
≤ sup{λ ∈ R : ρ˜ABZZ′ ≤ 2−λ |Z|1A ⊗ σ˜BZZ′} (12)
≤ Hεmin(A|BZZ ′)ρ + log |Z| .
Here, ρ˜ABZZ′ is an extension of ρ˜ABZ that is ε-close to ρABZZ′ and satisfies ΠZZ′ ρ˜ABZZ′ΠZZ′ = ρ˜ABZZ′ , where
ΠZZ′ :=
∑
z |zz〉〈zz|ZZ’. The existence of such an extension can be deduced from the fact that projections can only
decrease the purified distance [29] and ΠZZ′ commutes with ρABZZ′ . Furthermore, σ˜BZZ′ := ΠZZ′ (σ˜BZ ⊗ 1Z’)ΠZZ′ .
The last inequality follows since ρ˜ABZZ′ and σ˜BZZ′ are candidates for the optimization of the min-entropy. It remains
to show the implication
ρ˜ABZ ≤ 2−λ 1A ⊗ σ˜BZ =⇒ ρ˜ABZZ′ ≤ 2−λ |Z|1A ⊗ σ˜BZ ⊗ 1Z’ (13)
which in turn implies (12). However, (13) follows from the fact that, for any extension XAB of a positive operator XA,
it holds that XAB ≤ |B|XA⊗1B. Since XAB has a spectral decomposition with positive coefficients, it is sufficient to
show this property for pure normalized states |ψ〉〈ψ|AB. The general property then follows by taking the weighted sum
on both sides of the inequality. Let τA := trB(|ψ〉〈ψ|AB) and ΓAB := (τ−
1
2
A ⊗1B)|ψ〉〈ψ|AB (τ
− 12
A ⊗1B), where the inverse
is taken on the support of τA. Since ΓAB is of rank 1, its maximum eigenvalue is tr(ΓAB) = rank{τA} ≤ min{|A|, |B|}
and, thus, ΓAB ≤ |B|1AB. Hence, by conjugation of both sides with τ
1
2
A follows |ψ〉〈ψ|AB ≤ |B| τA⊗1B. This concludes
the proof.
The following lemma, which shows that conditioning on an additional quantum system C cannot decrease the
conditional smooth min-entropy by more than 2 log |C|, follows immediately from Lemmas 11 and 12
Lemma 13. Hεmin(A|BC)ρ ≥ Hεmin(A|B)ρ − 2 log |C|.
B. Main Results
(Classical) Bit Commitment Resource
Theorem 14. Every quantum protocol which uses nA (classical) bit commitments from Alice to Bob and nB (classical)
bit commitments from Bob to Alice with n = nA+nB as a resource and implements an ε-hiding and ∆-binding string
commitment of length at most
ℓ ≤ n− 2 log
(
(1−∆)2
4
−
√
2ε
)
− 1.
In particular, if ∆ = ε ≤ 0.01, then ℓ ≤ n+ 6.
Proof. Let |x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxABC be the state resulting from the execution of an ε-hiding commitment protocol when the
input of Alice is x. Then ρXABC =
∑
x
1
2ℓ
|x〉〈x|⊗ρxABC is the state resulting from an execution where the committed
string X is uniformly distributed. Let ε˜ :=
√
2ε. Since ρXB is ε-close to uniform and P (ρ, ρ
′) ≤
√
2D(ρ, ρ′) [29], the
definition of the smooth min-entropy implies that
H ε˜min(X |B)ρ ≥ log |X | = ℓ.
9In the following, we consider a modified protocol that does not use the resource bit commitments. In this modified
protocol Alice, instead of using the resource bit commitments, measures the bits to be committed, stores a copy
and sends them to Bob, who stores them in a classical register CA. When one of these commitments is opened,
he moves the coresponding bit to his register B. Bob simulates the action of his commitments locally as follows:
instead of measuring a register, Y , and sending the outcome to the commitment functionality, he applies the isometry
U : |y〉Y 7→ |yy〉Y Y ′ purifying the measurement of the committed bit and stores Y ′ in register CB . When Bob has to
open the commitment, he measures Y ′ and sends the outcome to Alice over the classical channel. Note that we make
Bob more powerful in this modified protocol because he can simulate the original protocol locally. Thus, any successful
attack of Alice against the modified protocol implies a successful attack against the original protocol. Since we only
make use of the modified protocol to construct an attack against Bob, the modified protocol does not have to be
hiding. Furthermore, the state conditioned on the classical communication is again pure. Let |x〉〈x|⊗ ρ¯xAB be the state
resulting from the execution of the modified protocol when the input of Alice is x. Then ρ¯XAB =
∑
x
1
2ℓ
|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρ¯xAB
is the state resulting from an execution where the committed string X is uniformly distributed. From Lemma 10 we
know that there exists a function f : {0, 1}ℓ → {0, 1} such that
D(ρX0BC , ρ
X1
BC) ≤ 2δ
where ρXzBC =
1
2ℓ−1
∑
x∈f−1(z) ρ
x
BC , δ := ε˜+
1
2
√
21−H
ε˜
min(X|BC)ρ and C stands for CACB. Let z ∈ {0, 1} and let Alice
prepare the state
1√
2ℓ−1
∑
x∈f−1(z)
|x〉X ⊗ |x〉X′
and honestly executes the commit protocol with the first half of this state as input. Let ρXzA′BCACB = ρ
Xz
XX′ABCACB
be the resulting joint state at the end of the commit phase. Then we have trA’(ρ
Xz
A′BCACB
) = ρXzBCACB and, therefore,
Lemma 5 then implies that there exists unitary UA such that
D(ρ˜XzA′BCACB , ρ
Xz
A′BCACB
) ≤ 2
√
δ, (14)
where ρ˜XzA′BCACB = (UA′ ⊗ 1B)ρXzA′BCACB (UA′ ⊗ 1B)†. Lemmas 11 and 12 imply that
H ε˜min(X |BCACB)ρ ≥ H ε˜min(X |BCB)ρ − nA
≥ H ε˜min(X |B)ρ − n
≥ ℓ− n (15)
Thus, we have
1−∆ ≤ 2
√
δ = 2
√
ε˜+
1
2
√
21−H
ε˜
min(X|BCACB)ρ
≤ 2
√
ε˜+
1
2
√
21−ℓ+n
≤ 2
√√
2ε+ 2−
1
2 (ℓ−n+1)
where we used the definition of weakly ∆-binding and inequalities (14) and (15).
Quantum Resource
Next, we consider implementations of string commitments from a functionality which allows the players to commit
to (and later reveal) n qubit states. The following theorem shows that there cannot exist a protocol using such a
resource which implements an arbitrarily hiding and binding string commitment of length larger than 2n.
Theorem 15. Every quantum protocol which uses a resource, which allows the players to commit to (and later reveal)
n qubit states and implements an ε-hiding and ∆-binding string commitment of length ℓ must have
ℓ ≤ 2n− 2 log
(
(1−∆)2
4
−
√
2ε
)
− 1. (16)
In particular, if ∆ = ε ≤ 0.01, then ℓ ≤ 2n+ 6.
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Proof. Let |x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxABC be the state resulting from the execution of an ε-hiding commitment protocol when the
input of Alice is x. Then ρXABC =
∑
x
1
2ℓ |x〉〈x|⊗ρxABC is the state resulting from an execution where the committed
string X is uniformly distributed. Let ε˜ :=
√
2ε. Since ρXB is ε-close to uniform and P (ρ, ρ
′) ≤
√
2D(ρ, ρ′) [29], the
definition of the smooth min-entropy implies that
H ε˜min(X |B)ρ ≥ log |X | = ℓ.
From Lemma 13 we have
H ε˜min(X |BC)ρ ≥ H ε˜min(X |B)ρ − 2 log |C|. (17)
From Lemma 10 we know that there exists a function f : {0, 1}ℓ → {0, 1} such that
D(ρX0BC , ρ
X1
BC) ≤ 2δ
where ρXzBC =
1
2ℓ−1
∑
x∈f−1(z) ρ
x
BC and δ := ε˜+
1
2
√
21−H
ε˜
min(X|BC)ρ . Let z ∈ {0, 1} and let Alice prepare the state
1√
2ℓ−1
∑
x∈f−1(z)
|x〉X ⊗ |x〉X′
and honestly execute the commit protocol with the first half of this state as input. Let ρXzA′BC = ρ
Xz
XX′ABC be the
resulting state. Then we have trA’(ρ
Xz
A′BC) = ρ
Xz
BC and, therefore, Lemma 5 implies that there exists a unitary UA′
such that
D(ρ˜
X1−z
A′BC , ρ
X1−z
A′BC) ≤ 2
√
δ (18)
where ρ˜
X1−z
A′BC = (UA′ ⊗ 1BC)ρXzA′BC(UA ⊗ 1BC)†. This implies that
1−∆ ≤ 2
√
δ = 2
√
ε˜+
1
2
√
21−H
ε˜
min(X|BC)ρ
≤ 2
√
ε˜+
1
2
√
21−ℓ+2n
≤ 2
√√
2ε+ 2−
1
2 (ℓ−2n+1)
where we used the definition of weakly ∆-binding and inequalities (17) and (18).
Note that the proof of Theorem 15 only uses the fact that the resource could be simulated by Bob such that the
resulting state at the end of the commit phase is pure conditioned on all the classical communication and the simulated
resource uses an additional memory of size at most log |C|. Thus, inequality (16) holds for arbitrary such resources
with log |C| ≤ n. A simple example of such a resource would be a functionality which generates a tripartite state
|φ〉ABC and gives system A to Alice and B to Bob.
